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This paper argues that detailed studies of particular economies, such as Bob Gregory’s work on
Australia, are relevant to all of economics. The paper builds on the concept of a model species from
biology to develop the notion of a model economy – one whose experiences illuminate fundamental
economic issues; examines the criterion for an economy to serve as a model economy; and describes
three areas – labour relations and the awards system of wage-setting, marketizing public services and
growth through immigration and natural resources – where Australian experience provides insights
into economic behaviour and the operation of markets broadly.
Richard B. Freeman
National Bureau of Economic Research
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138-5398
freeman@nber.org  3 
  Why should anyone outside of New Zealand or outside the circle of 
friends of Bob Gregory be interested in the Australian economy?  It’s far away 
from the real world of the US, Europe, Japan, and from the growth economies of 
Asia. With just 0.3% of the world’s population and 1.1% of world output, 
Australia is a small player in the world economy.  It has natural resources but not 
the oil that fuels global economic activity and pollutes the planet. 
  In this paper I argue that there are good reasons for economists to concern 
themselves with Australian economic developments even if they live far from the 
Antipodes and have never talked shop at Australian National University.  
Australia does enough things differently than other economies, such as the awards 
system of wage-setting, the income contingent mode of funding higher education, 
and privatizing public employment services, to provide insights into economic 
behaviour and the operation of markets that are otherwise difficult to identify.  To 
the extent that the economic behaviour of people is comparable across countries, 
what we find in Australia can be generalized more broadly.   
  My argument has three parts.  First, I build on the concept of a  model 
species from biology, where analysts have thought deeply about generalizing 
findings from one species to others, to develop the notion of a model economy – 
one whose experiences illuminate fundamental economic issues and institutional 
and policy choices in other economies.  Second, I examine the criterion necessary 
for an economy, such as Australia’s, to serve as a model economy, and for the 
generalizability of particular findings. Section III examines economic areas in 
which Australia would seem to be a model economy, deserving detailed attention   4 
from the rest of the world.   Since Bob Gregory’s work has focused almost 
exclusively on the Australian economy, I view the paper as an examination of the 
validity of a country-specific “Gregorian” approach to economic research.  
 
I.  Learning from Model Species  Economies 
Almost everything we know about the fundamental properties of 
living cells – how they grow and divide, how they express their 
genetic information, and how they use and store information – has 
come from the study of model organisms. – Fields and Johnston, 
2005 
  Most biologists spend their scientific lives studying particular species – 
slugs, bacteria, flies, yeast, squid, zebra fish, mustard plants, mice, etc – known as 
model species or organisms.  Biologists dedicate themselves to a particular 
species not because they have a weird fetish for that creature but because that 
species provides exceptional insight into some fundamental biological issue.  
Mendel’s peas opened the door to the genetics of inheritance that no other 
organism might have done.  The fruit fly allowed Morgan and others to locate 
mutations on genes and to examine how mutations affect phenotypes and recently 
for Bender to illuminate the genetics of  behaviour. The giant axon of the squid 
Loligo pealei makes it a model for studies of nerve functions. The transparent 
body of the zebra fish allows scientists to see the operation of its internal organs.  
Mice are a model for diseases that affect humans because mice have an 
immunological system and contract some human diseases.  And so on.
1 
i. Attributes of a Model   5 
  Biologists highlight four factors in determining whether a species becomes 
a model organism, studied by hundreds or thousands of researchers around the 
world, or lives a life of quiet obscurity
2: 1)  the tractability of researching the 
species, which depends on accessibility, the ease of experimenting on it and the 
cost of maintaining it with extant laboratory technology;
3 2) the presence of some 
distinct feature(s) that allows researchers to make outstanding/speedy progress in 
a significant line of inquiry; 3) the potential for generalizing findings to other 
creatures, particularly to humans;
4 4) the cumulated knowledge about the species, 
which creates (in our lingo) economies of scale or agglomeration effects in 
research.
5  
  The parallel in economics for experimental tractability is the availability 
of reliable data on economic behaviour.  When Simon Kuznets developed 
national income accounts in the 1920s, the critical data need was for reliable 
statistics on sales and income to show how the aggregate economy was 
performing.  Today the data go far beyond national accounts and measures of 
economic aggregates to include diverse micro data on individuals and firms, such 
as: longitudinal information on employees or employers; matched employer-
employee files over time; time budget studies; data on patents and R&D; 
measures of individual health and biological markers linked to wages, 
employment, and other outcomes; measures of workplace practices and 
productivity; and so on.  The French and Scandinavians have been particularly 
good in developing matched longitudinal employee-employer data files (Abowd 
and Kramarz, 1999).  The Scandinavians have good data relating biological   6 
measures, such as birth weight, to future outcomes.  The UK has exceptional data 
on labour practices at workplaces in the form of the Workplace Employment 
Relation Surveys.   
  Ready availability of the standard labour force or firm survey data files 
that countries use to measure the state of an economy is also important.  Nearly 
every country conducts censuses and surveys of businesses and residents.  But 
most limit access to these data.  A model economy should ideally provide 
downloadable data over the Internet, so that researchers around the world can 
study its workings.  The University of Minnesota PUMS project that makes US 
Census files freely available on the Internet and the US Bureau of the Census’s 
provision of Current Population Survey files to researchers (most easily 
downloadable from NBER) have sparked work on the US using those particular 
sources of information.   
  For its part, Australia has an excellent body of statistics for analysis of the 
labour market, ranging from cross-section surveys to longitudinal surveys (Le and 
Miller, 1998; Marks and Rothman, 2003), including a unique longitudinal survey 
of immigrants (Cobb-Clark, 2001), workplace surveys (Hawke and Wooden, 
1997), time use surveys, regular Censuses (Flatau, 1997) , input output tables 
(Gretton, 2005), the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia survey 
(Watson and Wooden, 2004) and so on.   If the Australian Social Science Data 
Archive (http://assda.anu.edu.au/index.html) or the Australian Statistical Bureau 
were to make these files readily downloadable on the Web, it would attract 
international research attention, to the benefit of Australian social science and   7 
policy-makers and social science broadly.  
  Tractability of research involves one additional factor as well: ease of 
generating new data from market participants through interviews or surveys.  
Given that statistical relations are often open to multiple interpretations, the 
testimony of market participants, who have first hand knowledge of their own 
incentives, motivations, and circumstances, can be crucial in understanding 
events. As a case in point, when California had its energy crisis in 2000-2001, 
most economists blamed the crisis on impersonal market forces that operated in 
an inefficiently deregulated energy marketplace.
6 Claims that oil supplying firms 
had engineered the crisis were dismissed as the blathering of radical conspiracy 
theorists, though criminal manipulating of markets fits well with economic theory 
and the history of capitalism.  Investigations by the US Attorney for Northern 
California showed that Enron had manipulated the market and produced guilty 
pleas from the market traders.
7  Statistical analyses would never have uncovered 
the illegal manipulation behind the California crisis.  While this is an extreme 
case, the statements by participants in other decisions also cast light on competing 
explanations that neither theory nor econometrics can match.  In the labour area, 
the statements by ACTU and national union leaders provide critical insight into 
why the Australian union movement endorsed a decentralized wage-setting 
system in 1990-91 (Briggs, 2001, pp. 33-34).   One of the few advantages that 
social science has over the natural sciences in research is that we can interrogate 
the decision-makers about whom we build our models, which should help us 
assess competing explanations or theories.  Without controlled lab experiments to   8 
nail things down, we have to use whatever information we can get. 
  Just as a model organism requires some special feature that gives it a leg 
up in discovery, a model economy must experience some special exogenous or 
near exogenous variation in economic conditions that allows researchers to draw 
stronger or more reliable inferences from it than from some other economy.  The 
variation could be a change in policy – a sudden alteration in tariffs, imposition of 
new labour laws, development of an independent central bank; rapid expansion of 
the supply of schooling; etc; – that creates incentives for people to alter 
behaviour.  It could be a shock from outside, such as changes in the prices of 
exports or imports due to factors overseas, an energy shortage per the California 
crisis, a large demographic shift.  It could even be an epidemic that kills much of 
a population, which T.W. Schultz (1983) suggested was an ideal test for the claim 
that traditional agricultural societies have labour surpluses with zero marginal 
product of labour.  What is important is that the change be sufficiently big that 
reactions to it dominate other factors impacting an economy over some period of 
time.   
  The availability of experimental or pseudo-experimental measures of 
outcomes before/ after policy initiatives can also provide insight into economic 
behaviour beyond responses to the specific initiative.  Researchers in economic 
development have studied the economics of education in Columbia and Indonesia 
because those countries have varied investments in schooling in experimental or 
pseudo-experimental ways and have made the data available to researchers 
(Duflo, 2002; Angrist, Bettinger, Kremer, 2004).   The hope is that the findings   9 
from these countries can be generalized to others, and thus help guide their 
investments in schooling.  Since we can conduct random assignment experiments 
even in countries that lack good data in other domains, low wage countries have a 
cost advantage in experimenting with economic incentives where the results are 
likely to generalize to other economies.  Extant studies show similarity in 
responses in experiments across country lines (Kagel and Roth, 1995). 
  Finally, the social science parallel to the fourth point listed above for a 
model species – a cumulated body of knowledge about the creature –is the 
strength of a country’s research community.  A research community with 
knowledge about how things work can be critical in assessing specific reforms, 
particularly those relating to broad-ranging institutions and practices.  De jure 
measures of institutions available to outsiders may not accurately represent how a 
given economy operates (Chor and Freeman, 2005), leading to potentially invalid 
interpretations, which a knowledgeable research community can correct.  
Availability of data on diverse parts of an economy - national income and flow of 
funds accounts, measures of trade and investment – is also critical, as it allows 
researchers to check the representativeness of samples and plausibility of statistics 
in particular areas. 
   In sum, any economy that combines good information with natural 
experimental variation or random assignment experiments in practices/policies is 
a viable candidate for model economy in those areas.  At the minimum, we will 
learn something about how the particular factors operate in one setting, which can 
be compared to how they operate in other economies.  At the maximum, we can   10 
learn something about behaviour or markets that generalize from that economy to 
other economies which we could not learn elsewhere. 
 
II. Generalizing When Ceteris Is Not Paribus 
  The degree to which results can be generalized from a model system is 
more problematic in economics than in biology.  In biology, cellular processes 
operate similarly across living creatures, in part because they obey universal 
scientific laws and in part because they have the same evolutionary heritage.
8  We 
share 96% of our DNA sequence with chimpanzees, according to the latest 
estimates
9, are closely related to worms and flies, and dingos and kangaroos, for 
that matter.  But generalizations across specie lines are easier at the molecular and 
gene level than at the level of complete organisms.  Doctors often test medicines 
on mice or monkeys first, but they invariably do human trials to see if the 
medicine works on humans. 
  Using the biology analogy, the responses of individuals to incentives 
would seem to be comparable to cellular processes, while the interactions of 
people in organizations or markets as well as the general equilibrium interactions 
in entire economies would be closer to whole organisms.  This suggests that 
phenomenon where the independent responses of people are critical– say demand 
responses to price incentives – would generalize better across economies than 
phenomenon involving interactions among groups, such as the institutional design 
of markets.  From this perspective, estimates of demand and supply elasticities 
should be more comparable across countries than, say, estimates of the effects of   11 
unions on outcomes.  
  Population and output per capita should also affect generalizability. 
Analysts often claim that the successes of Hong Kong or Singapore – city-states – 
have little to say to larger countries such as Korea or China, since social 
complexity grows with population.  The European Union social dialogue model of 
dealing with labour problems works better in Scandinavia, Austria, Ireland, than 
in the more populous countries.  On output per capita, development economics 
lives on the notion that developing countries differ in important ways from 
advanced countries; while advanced countries rarely look at what they can learn 
from developing countries.
10 
  But even when economies have similar levels of complexity, generalizing 
from one to another can be problematic to the extent that institutions or practices 
affect outcomes interactively.  When institutions/practices affect outcomes 
without interactions, linear regressions identify their impact on outcomes. But if 
the effect of an institution depends on the presence/absence of others, so that the 
configuration of practices matters, the situation is more complex (Ragin, 1987).  
In this case, a country may have to transform many institutions and practices to 
match the performance of a model economy,
11 per the big bang transition from 
communism to capitalism that has not worked well for most ex-Soviet states.  
Because the number of configurations rises rapidly with the number of 
institutions/practices, moreover, it is difficult to determine what works or does not 
work from the limited number of observations we have on particular economies.
12  
  To deal with this problem, analysts seeking to learn from cross-country   12 
comparisons often group economies into families with similar institutional 
features.  The advanced English-speaking economies provide one natural 
grouping, with their strong market orientation and English common law tradition 
(Freeman, Boxall, Haynes, forthcoming 2006).  Within that grouping, it is 
presumably easier to generalize between Australia and New Zealand, or between 
Canada and the US, than from either of those groups to the United Kingdom or 
Ireland.  The Scandinavian countries form another grouping over which 
generalizations would seem to have primae facie validity.  Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silane, and Shleifer (2003) have proposed that the legal tradition of 
countries offers a useful means to group them.  The logic of seeking 
generalizations in closely related settings suggests examining practices or policies 
within a given country as the first step in moving from the specific to the general.  
If something works in New South Wales but not in Melbourne, it would not be 
sensible to make broad claims about that policy or institution.  A federalist 
structure, which naturally produces regional variation, increases the potential for 
an economy to be a model for others.  
  Another way to approach the configuration problem is to assume that the 
diverse institutions reflect some underlying latent factor, such as reliance on 
markets to allocate resources, that can be summarized in a thermometer style 
scale. The Fraser Institute’s economic freedom index takes this approach, as does 
the Heritage Foundation’s competing index.  Australia rates fairly high as a “free 
market” economy on these measures, which suggests that it is more valid to 
generalize from Australia to the market-oriented economies, which include the   13 
major English-speaking economies, than to economies further from the free 
market end of the scale.      
  Finally, the potentially most devastating limitation on generalizing from 
one economy to another occurs when history matters greatly in the way 
individuals or institutions respond to particular incentives. Since every country 
has its own unique history, strong path or historical dependence limits 
generalizations from other countries.  In this case, even copying the institutions 
and practices of a model economy need not give the same outcomes.  It is critical 
in comparative analysis to delimit the domains of issues where history matters 
heavily and where it does no, if we are to generalize from model economies. 
i. Unintended Side Effects 
  Decision-makers want to know what works in another economy or 
business in order to transplant successful policies or practices to their own.  But 
their concerns often go beyond the generalizability to the potential that a 
successful transplant will have possible unintended consequences.  To take an 
extreme case, the main concern that the Chinese government has with freedom of 
association for workers is not the economic effects of unionism on the labour 
market, which might reduce inequalities and help channel social discontent in 
ways consistent with economic goals, but that independent unions could lead to a 
Solidarnosc-style union movement that would bring about democratic reforms.  In 
a more limited area, when the US was assessing possible reforms in the labour 
relations system in the mid 1990s, the Chairman of the National Labor Relations 
Board, William Gould IV argued against EU style works council as follows:     14 
partial transplantation (of labour practices) from a different system 
is a dangerous thing ... (and we) should tread warily about adopting 
fully systems which have been devised in the context of other legal 
frameworks and cultures, [for fear that a works council] would 
create difficulties for our system of exclusive bargaining 
representation status.
13 
Business and labour groups were also opposed to this innovation.  Business feared 
that works councils would lead workers to form unions.  Unions feared that 
councils would substitute for unions.  Both felt that it was better to avoid reforms 
if they risked unintended effects on their interests.   
  Faced with a similar situation, the UK made a different decision.  For 
years, the British Trade Union Congress had opposed works councils as an 
institution devised in countries whose tradition of industrial relations differed 
from that of the voluntaristic UK.  In the 1990s, the TUC changed its views and 
endorsed European Works Councils and pressured the Labour government to 
accede to the EU Social Charter, including mandated works councils.  The TUC 
also favoured the introduction of a voting procedure to resolve disputes over 
representation at work places – a transplant from the US.  Management opposition 
to these changes was muted.   
  The difference between the US and UK response to the potential 
transplant of works councils reflects differing views about the extent to which the 
foreign institution would fit with existing institutions or catalyze other changes in 
the labour relations system.  With large numbers of workers seeking but unable to 
gain union representation through the exclusive representation bargaining system   15 
in the US, and with firms unable to offer non-union mechanisms of voice due to 
section 8(a)2 of the Labor Management Relations Act outlawing “company 
unions”,  the introduction of works councils threatened to change radically the 
US’s legalist labour relations system. In the voluntarist and less contentious 
labour relations scene in the UK, neither management nor unions saw works 
councils as particularly threatening.  
  Generalizing from these and related cases, it would seem that two factors 
determine how an economy will respond to a transplanted institution: 1) the 
nature of the potential change – whether it could be catalytic to other institutions 
or practices; and 2) the status of the recipient economy – its malleability to 
reforms, or stability.  A policy/practice that is catalytic could have a huge impact 
on a rigid institutional structure but only have a modest impact on a stable or 
malleable system. A policy/practice that is not catalytic would have no impact on 
a rigid system and be readily absorbed in malleable economy. 
 
III. Australia as Model Economy 
  There are (at least) three areas in which Australia has made unique 
innovations in policy/practice and had distinctive economic experiences which 
could yield findings that generalize to other economies.  These areas are: labour 
relations; use of market mechanisms to deliver public services in higher education 
and employment services; and economic growth through immigration and natural 
resources.  
i. Labour Relations   16 
‘Australia needs a workplace system geared to the future, not to the past’ – John 
Howard, 2005 
  When I first learned that Australia and New Zealand used an awards 
system to determine wages, I had the same kind of reaction that early settlers must 
have had on seeing the platypus or emu – utter disbelief.  Markets are supposed to 
set wages, not judges on industrial tribunal court proceedings.  In fact, judges 
aside, the Australian (and NZ) systems of awards are in the same family of 
institutional wage-setting as European mandatory extension systems of 
determining pay.  These systems guarantee that the bulk of the work force is 
covered by collective bargaining, regardless of the proportion unionized. This is 
in sharp contrast to the situation in the US, Canada, Japan, or the UK, among 
others, where there is a near one to one relation between the proportion of 
workers unionized and the proportion covered by collective bargaining.  Exhibit 1 
shows the difference between countries where collective bargaining is extended 
outside the bargaining unit and where it is not extended.  The horizontal axis 
shows the rate of union density.  The vertical axis shows the proportion of 
workers covered by institutionally set wages.  Along the 45 degree line union 
density and coverage are the same.  Points above the line represent situations 
where coverage exceeds density.  In 2002 Australia was far above 45 degree line.  
  By extending institutionally determined wages to much of the work force, 
awards or extension systems invariably lower the dispersion of wage.  From one 
perspective, they accomplish what the Invisible Hand has seemingly failed to do 
in the job market: establish a single price for a given type of labour.  From   17 
another perspective, they compress wages excessively, reducing incentives and 
employment. The Australian awards system appears to be an important 
determinant of the effect of other economic policies outcomes.  It is the main 
reason why equal pay legislation was more effective in increasing the pay of 
women relative to men in Australia than in the US (Gregory 1999; Gregory and 
Daly, 1991; Borland, 1999).  To the extent that the various Australian Accords in 
the 1980s succeeded, moreover, they did so because the wage-setting system 
covered the bulk of the work force.  
  In the 1990s-2000s, Australia shifted from its awards based system of pay 
determination to a more decentralized pay setting system.  The Australian Trade 
Union Congress initiated the shift by endorsing enterprise bargaining in the early 
1990s.  The Labour Party’s 1993 Industrial Relations Reform Act strengthened 
enterprise bargaining vis-a-vis awards.  The Coalition government’s 1996 
Workplace Relations Act introduced Australian Workplace Agreements to 
encourage individual arrangements, ended union shop type agreements in favor of 
freedom of association for workers and freedom of choice in the mode of wage 
setting (which gave choice largely to employers); and limited the authority of 
Industrial Relations Commission to make awards and to oversee the results from 
other modes of wage settlement. Comparable legislation in New Zealand 
produced a massive drop in union density and in collective bargaining coverage.  
As Table 1 shows, union density and pay setting by awards and collective 
bargaining also fell in Australia.  But the proportion of workers covered by 
institutional wage arrangements remained much higher than membership, at least   18 
through 2004.  Many Australian firms and workers preferred the status quo of 
collective contracts and awards to the alternative of individual AWA mode of pay 
setting that the 1996 legislation introduced.  As a result, Table 2 shows that as of 
2004 twenty percent of workers had pay set by awards and 41% had pay set by 
collective bargaining, giving a total of 61% with pay institutionally determined. 
  In November 2005 the Australian government enacted legislation to 
further privilege individual contracts over collective contracts and weaken labour 
market protections that workers won from the state and/or through collective 
action.  Under the new law, new employees could be required to sign an AWA 
individual contract as a condition of employment and to give up the right to be 
covered by a collective agreement.  Enterprise agreements would no longer 
override AWAs and the “no disadvantage test” that requires collective agreements 
and individual contracts to give workers pay and conditions equal to or better than 
the relevant award would be weakened.  The law would excuse firms with less 
than 100 employees from unfair dismissal laws; narrow the Industrial Relations 
Commission’s role in labour relations; and establish a new government body to 
set minimum awards over a smaller domain of issues.  Finally, the new law 
promised to make it more difficult for unions to strike while allowing 
management the freedom to lockout workers.  To accomplish this against the 
opposition of state governments, the federal government promised to nationalize 
industrial relations. 
  Are the proposed changes as radical as they appear?  The government and 
its opponents agree that the answer is yes.  A comparable change in corporate law   19 
might be to privilege privately owned firms over publicly owned corporations by 
removing the limited liability protection given to shareholders, and to reduce 
consumer protection legislation for products made by small private firms.  The 
changes go beyond anything that conservative governments in the UK or US have 
proposed.  The changes are also remarkable in that government has proposed 
them in a period when the Australian labour market and economy are functioning 
well, with low unemployment and rapid accelerated productivity growth (Parham, 
2004).  It is not the Winter of Discontent in 1980s Great Britain, nor the US air 
traffic controllers striking illegally against the Federal Government in 1981.   
   Given the weakened state of unions, the new legislation could be the nail 
in the coffin of collective labour arrangements in Australia, with potential 
reverberations for other countries.  Or it could prove that legislatively attacking 
the collective rights of workers creates greater political and economic turmoil 
than could justify such a policy.  In either case, the new legislation is the sort of 
“natural experiment” that will make Australia the model economy for assessing 
collectivism in the labour market. What more could one ask for to assess how 
labour codes affect labour relations and labour market performance than an 
unnecessary extreme change in labour law? A new Australian Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey perhaps to help assess the change. 
ii. Market Mechanisms for Public Services 
  In 1989 Australia developed the world’s first income contingent mode of 
funding much  of higher education – the Higher Education Contribution Scheme 
(HECS) (Chapman (2001).  The HECS has many features that fit with the   20 
predilections of economists.  It differentiates prices by field, gives students the 
option for paying fees up-front; offers a more equitable way of funding student 
education than taxing citizens to pay for the education of the future elite; is less 
risky for students than loans; and gives greater autonomy to universities. The 
government’s partial deregulation of the higher education system allows 
universities to determine the student contribution amount within the specified 
ranges.   
  Shifting the cost of higher education from the state to students has helped 
Australia to increase university enrollments while reducing state funding of higher 
education relative to GDP (Marginson, 2001, table 1).   In addition, the market 
orientation of Australian universities has led them to become world leaders in 
selling undergraduate education to the citizens of other countries, further 
increasing their revenues.  There is no evidence that the HECS has discouraged 
low income students from going to universities or reduced the overall rate of 
university attendance.  While the system has problems – student-faculty ratios 
have risen and faculty earnings have fallen relative to other groups, raising issues 
about quality – Chapman’s assessment is that the income contingent charge for 
higher education has worked.  No one has made a cogent case rejecting this 
assessment.  Given the seeming virtues of the system, the interesting question is 
why other countries have not copied the Australian model.  If detailed data on the 
system were readily available on a web site, including university by university 
records and surveys of students, analysts in other countries would download the 
information and perform the types of studies that would fit their country’s   21 
concerns, and thus spread this innovation. 
  It is not only in provision of higher education that Australia has been a 
world leader in marketizing government-funded services.  In most countries, the 
state aids unemployed job seekers through assistance in job finding, training, and 
other active labour market policies.  Until recently, some European countries 
restricted private employment agencies so that the state had an effective 
monopoly in many employment services.  In 1998 Australia chose a different 
route.  It privatized or outsourced employment services to non-profit and profit-
seeking agencies, as well as to competing public agencies – ‘a radical 
transformation of employment service delivery ...without parallel in OECD 
countries’ (OECD, 2001, p 15).  By opening the market for employment services 
to competitive bids, with the bulk of payments based on a fixed fee for successful 
placement of the unemployed, the Australian policy potentially unleashed the 
forces of competition on what had been an administrative function of the 
government.  The result was a large drop in the cost of employment services, with 
no apparent loss in the quality of services (Shergold, 2002), which impressed the 
OECD in its review of Australian labour market policies (OECD, 2001).  
However, the program has yet to receive the scrutiny of the microeconomic 
evaluation research community, with specified counter factuals to assess 
outcomes (Dawkins, 2002) and detailed studies of particular programs.  As a 
result independent researchers have taken a more skeptical view (Webster and 
Harding, 2001; Oslington, 2005) than the OECD, withholding judgment until data 
from providers of services are open to public scrutiny.  Webster and Harding note   22 
that the public sector had higher labour productivity than the private sector in 
placing workers under the predecessor Working Nation program (Webster and 
Harding, p 240), which raises questions about what underlies the cost savings of 
the new program.   
  To make a scientific case for the Australian model of market-driven 
government funded employment services requires two detailed research 
investigations.  The first needed research is random assignment experiments 
comparing the effectiveness of different services (Webster, 1998; Burtless, 2002).  
Since Australia changed the entire system, with multiple service providers 
offering different services in different ways, a random assignment study of the 
full change is impossible.  Still, the government and agencies can undertake 
analyses of some services, which would enable them to decide what is working 
and what is not, and thus improve the system.  The second area where research 
could greatly illuminate the Australian model is in the newly developing market 
for contracting out employment services.  The outsourcing of public employment 
through a market mechanism offers a unique opportunity to examine the 
organizations that enter and exit the market, the quality of services provided by 
different government, private and community agencies, and the way in which 
these organizations respond to winning or losing contracts.  The results from such 
a study could generalize to other markets where governments are considering 
outsourcing provision of public goods. 
iii. Growing Oz:  Immigration and Natural Resources    23 
  As a “settler economy” Australia has grown through immigration and the 
application of modern technology to extract natural resources and to the 
development of agriculture.  Since not all settler economies have been economic 
successes – Argentina is often viewed as Australia’s errant twin economy in this 
respect -- and since natural resources have proven to be as much of a curse as a 
boon to an economy (Sachs and Warner, 1999; Ross, 1999) -- Australia’s success 
in growing through immigration and escaping the problems of a profitable mining 
sector make it a model for other resource intensive economies.   
  On the immigration side, in 2000 approximately one fourth of the 
Australian population were immigrants – twice the proportion in the US and thirty 
percent more than the proportion in Canada.
14 The flow of immigration into 
Australia was above the flow into the US, despite the US’s massive increase in 
immigration over the 1990s. The only other advanced countries with comparable 
flows of immigrants are Israel and New Zealand.  With immigrant flows of these 
magnitudes, the effects of immigration invariably go beyond the micro-economic 
issues that dominate the bulk of the literature in the US and most other OECD 
countries – how immigrants fare in the labour market compared to natives and 
how immigrants affect native substitute workers.  Australia is a model economy 
for understanding the impact of immigration on macro-economic outcomes and 
economic growth, and of the economies of scale and the composition of 
immigrants that help determine aggregate effects (Junankar, Pope and Withers, 
1998).   While there is no definitive analysis of the potential scale economies 
from immigration (OECD, 2003), evidence that immigrants have had little   24 
adverse effects on the wages or employment of natives (Chang, 2004; Addison 
and Worswick, 2002), that growth and immigration, particularly of skilled 
workers, are positively related over time (Pope and Withers, 1995; Nevile, 1990) 
and the country’s policy of selecting immigrants on the basis of labour skills, are 
consistent with the notion that immigration contributed to growth per capita rather 
than detracted from it.   
  Going a step further, Australia’s variations in policy for selecting 
immigrants itself that provides lessons for other countries.  Until the early 1970s, 
the country subsidized passage for Europeans from some countries.  Since then 
Australia has used a point system to encourage immigration of skilled workers 
(Miller, 1999)  By 1989/90 52% of Australian immigrants came as skilled 
workers compared to 39% of Canadians and 8% of Americans (Antecol, Cobb-
Clark, Trejo, 2001, table 2).  Australian gives points to persons who attend 
Australian universities, which presumably both attract students to Australian 
universities and encourages their immigration.  The Longitudinal Survey of 
Immigrants to Australia provides data that goes beyond standard Census and 
labour force survey data on immigration to deal with issues of assimilation and 
career progress (Chiswick, Lee, and Miller, 2005). 
  On the natural resources side, Australia has developed economically 
despite being highly dependent on minerals/fuels and agriculture for the bulk of 
its exports.  The country fell from near the top of the GDP per capita league tables 
– 5th in the OECD in 1950 to a much lower position – 15
th in 1990, but 
rebounded in the 1990s with a sustained period of economic growth to reach 7
th   25 
spot in 2003.  The Gregory thesis curse in which a booming mining/natural 
resource sector where relatively few people work boosts the real exchange rates 
and erodes the competitive position of other exporters, notably in manufacturing 
where many people work and in agriculture, where many people once worked, has 
somehow not prevented Australia from growth and prosperity. Indeed, the mineral 
share of exports rose during the 1990s period of rapid growth so that in 2004, 
minerals/fuels made up 40% of Australia’s exports.  If China continues to become 
the manufacturing center of the world, more countries may find that natural 
resources will be more important to economic growth than in the past, and should 
look to the Australian experience here.  If there is one area where the rest of the 
world needs to learn more about Australian experiences, it is how the country has 
managed to avoid the resource curse (McLean, 2004; McLean and Taylor, 2003; 
Anderson, 2001).       
 
IV. Conclusion: The Advantage of Home Brew 
  The argument that economics has much to learn from behaviour in ”model 
economies” just as biology learns from model species directs attention at the 
variation in policies and practices in economies regardless of location. The 
requirements for a model economy are adequate data; a knowledgeable set of 
home grown economists; interesting variation in policies/practices; and sufficient 
similarity to other economies to allow findings to be generalized.  In addition, 
model economies can provide independent tests of models initially fit on other 
economies, where specification search (Leamer, 1978) risks over fitting the data   26 
to match the idiosyncracy of that country’s experiences.  Because no single 
economy offers the best variation/instruments for studying more than a few 
issues, there is space for more model economies than model species. 
  Australia’s unique policies and practices and accessible data make it a 
model economy for illuminating the critical issues summarized above and 
potentially others as well.  The country’s political system seems adept at creating 
extreme policy experiments that will illuminate economic issues for the 
foreseeable future, particularly in the direction of greater reliance on markets.  As 
a result, there is a lot the “real world” can learn from Australian experience – as 
Bob Gregory has done throughout his career.  The one thing Australia could do to 
enhance the economy’s status as a model system would be to make Australian 
data more readily available over the Internet to international researchers.  Because 
interpreting data requires tacit knowledge about an economy – home brew that is 
easier for residents to imbibe than overseas scholars --Australian economists will 
almost certainly maintain an edge in analyzing these data.  Such provision would 
more likely raise than lower demand for their services.  Imagine, more economists 
joining Bob and the cork hatted gang at the pub to ponder what’s going on down 
under and what it means for economics and the real world.  Home brew and 
economics.  Sounds good.  Who needs cricket and Aussie rules football and all 
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Exhibit 1: Union Density and Coverage, 2000 
Percentage of Wage and Salary Earners 
 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2004, Chart 3.4   28 
Table 1: Percentage of Workers in Unions and Percentage Covered by 
Collective Bargaining, Australia and New Zealand, 1980 to 2003 
 
  Australia    New Zealand 
  Union  CB    Union  CB 
Before Legal Changes, ~1980  48  88    56  67 
           
The Changes: 1991 NZ Employment Contracts Act: 
1996 Australian Workplace Relations Act 
         
           
2000  25  60    17  20 
2002  23  59    17  18 
2003  23  58    17  17 
2004  23  58    --  -- 
           
Before to After Changes  -25  -30    -39  -50 
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (May 2004, cat no 6306.0); Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (August 2004, cat no 6310.0); Harbridge, et al (2003); May, 
et al (2003).   29 
 
Table 2: Percentage of Workers With Wages Set by Specified Mechanism, 
2004 
 
Awards   
Mode of Wage-Setting  Percentage Covered 
Awards  20 
Collective bargaining               41 
Individual         34 
Proprietors/           5 
   
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (May 2004, cat no 6306.0).   30 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1.The Scientist, vol.17, supplement 1 June 2, 2003 Biology’s Models (www.the-
scientist.com/yr2003/jun/) discusses the “eight most used and most useful” model 
organisms. The article “model organism” in Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org) 
gives valuable references and another  list of model organisms.  Also, see 
www.wellcome.ac.uk.  NIH gives references to model organisms for biomedical 
research. (Www.nih.gov/science/models) 
2.See Mandoli and Omstead (2000), Kellogg and Shaffer (1993), in addition to 
the articles cited in footnote 3.  Fields and Johnston (2005) ask whether new 
technologies for analyzing gene function will obsolesce model organism research 
and conclude that they will not.  
3.This gives an edge to small creatures that are plentiful in the environment, that 
reproduce quickly, and that have readily discernible attributes or behaviour.  
4.A model organism “must not only be convenient to work on, but it also has to 
be related to other things that are useful”– John Sulston, cited in  
www.welcome.ac.uk/en/genome/genesandbody/hg05f003.html,  p 2 
5.Once many scientists work on a given species and develop protocols for 
experiments, isolate mutants, sequence its genes, the cost of  research falls, which 
attracts others.  Still, model organisms are not fixed in number.  Innovators have 
turned previously ignored species into models by making important discoveries 
from analyzing that species. And new technologies can expand the model species 
to more complex creatures (Fields and Johnston, 2005). 
6.Paul Joskow, California’s  Electricity Crisis (MIT Sept 28, 2001) 
http://web.mit.edu/ceepr/www/2001-006.pdf is the most cogent economic 
analysis.  See 
http://www.erisk.com/Learning/CaseStudies/ref_case_californiacrisis.asp  for a 
time line 
7.http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/can/press/html/2004_08_05_forney.html gives the 
details of the plea bargain by James Forney, who devised the “Death Star”. 
Forney was the third conviction the US Attorney' s Office obtained in its 
investigation into the illegal manipulation by Enron of California' s energy 
markets from 1999 to 2001.   43 
                                                                                                                                     
8.Nature did not “completely reinvent the wheel and come up with a new set of 
molecular rules for each phylum” Thomas Carew, a specialist in the mollusk 
Aplysia californica, cited by D. Steinberg, “Illuminating Behaviors”, The 
Scientist, vol 17, supplement 1, June 2, 2003, p1. 
9.http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2005/Sep/01-272693.html.  The estimate has 
varied over time, due to the subtleties in making such comparisons. 
10.If advanced countries thought policies were readily transportable from 
developing countries, they would presumably fund policy experiments in those 
countries, draw lessons from the experiments, and then import the successes. 
11.Studies of labour practices find that firms need a bundle of advanced human 
resource practices to create a high performance workplace (Ichniowski, Shaw, 
Prennushi, 1997).  
12.With four institutions/practices and the 0/1 measure of their state, there are 2
4 
= 16 possible configurations to investigate before deciding on the best course of 
action.  With six institutions/practices, there are 64 possible configurations.  And 
so on. 
13.William Gould IV, Chairman, NLRB, Sept 29, 1994, reported in Commission 
on the Future of Worker-Management Relations. 
14.  In 2000, 24.6% of Australians were immigrants compared to 12.4% of 
Americans and 18.9% of Canadians.  The ratio of annual immigration to the 
population in Australia was 0.51% compared to 0.45% for the United States. 